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Although our sensory experience is mostly multisensory in nature, research on working
memory representations has focused mainly on examining the senses in isolation.
Results from the multisensory processing literature make it clear that the senses
interact on a more intimate manner than previously assumed. These interactions raise
questions regarding the manner in which multisensory information is maintained in
working memory. We discuss the current status of research on multisensory processing
and the implications of these findings on our theoretical understanding of working
memory. To do so, we focus on reviewing working memory research conducted from a
multisensory perspective, and discuss the relation between working memory, attention,
and multisensory processing in the context of the predictive coding framework. We argue
that a multisensory approach to the study of working memory is indispensable to achieve
a realistic understanding of how working memory processes maintain and manipulate
information.
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A Multisensory Perspective of Working Memory
In everyday life we experience a continuous stream of information that we perceive through sight,
sound, smell, taste, and touch. Even though this experience is mostly multisensory, that is, we
receive information from multiple senses simultaneously, psychological research has primarily
focused on studying our senses in isolation. While we are beginning to understand how our senses
interact at various stages of processing (for an overview see, e.g., Wallace et al., 1993; Beauchamp,
2005; Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; Stein and Stanford, 2008; Klemen and Chambers, 2012)
it is still heavily debated whether the higher-order mental representations that are derived from
these sensory inputs still contain modality- specific information or not. For instance, in working
memory, research has focused on resolving whether information is memorized in the form of
separate, modality or domain specific representations (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Schneider and
Detweiler, 1988), or as integrated representations (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Cowan, 2001).
Multisensory processing refers to the interaction of signals arriving nearly simultaneously
from different sensory modalities. This implies that information from one modality
can influence information processing in another modality. Information from different
sensory modalities can also be combined into a single multisensory event, a process that
is referred to as multisensory integration (Stein et al., 2010). In accordance with the
suggestions of Stein et al. (2010) we will use the terms ‘‘modality-specific’’ or ‘‘cross-
modal’’ when describing the properties of objects and ‘‘unisensory’’ or ‘‘multisensory’’
when referring to neural or behavioral processes associated with a single or multiple sensory
modalities.
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The aim of this paper is to discuss the current status of
research on multisensory processing and the implications of
these findings for our theoretical understanding of working
memory. To do so, we will focus on reviewing working memory
research conducted from a multisensory perspective. We will
argue that a multisensory approach to the study of working
memory is indispensable to achieve a realistic understanding
of how working memory processes maintain and manipulate
information.
Working Memory and the Multisensory
Brain
In their seminal work, Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) devised
a model for the flow of information in human memory,
which subsequently became known as the modal model. They
suggested that environmental information is processed by
various modality-specific sensory registers before it is combined
into a single, modality-independent, or more formally amodal,
percept and transferred into a short-term store. According
to this view, the short-term store is an amodal, general-
purpose mechanism. Atkinson and Shiffrin referred to this
mechanism as ‘‘working memory’’, as it was considered to
be responsible for a variety of operations, such as the
selection, manipulation, and rehearsal of the memorized
items.
A few years later, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed
a multiple-component model of working memory where
information is assumed to be stored in two domain-specific
subsystems (the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial
sketchpad) that are directed by a general control mechanism
(the central executive). The phonological loop is responsible
for short-term maintenance of speech-based and acoustic items.
The visuo-spatial sketchpad maintains visually and/or spatially
encoded items. In contrast to Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968)
idea of a domain-independent (i.e., amodal) store, Baddeley and
Hitch (1974) assume that information (e.g., verbal or spatial) is
maintained in its corresponding domain-specific store.
Over the years it has become clear that information
from different domains showed more interaction in working
memory than one would expect from a strongly domain-
specific perspective (e.g., Jiang et al., 2000; Logie et al., 2000;
Prabhakaran et al., 2000). An episodic buffer was added to
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) original working memory model
to account for, amongst other things, the apparent interaction
between phonological and visual processes (Baddeley, 2000).
The episodic buffer can be conceived as an amodal storage
component, which was estimated to hold up to four chunks
of information. Additionally, it was proposed to act as a link
between all the other working memory components described
above. For this revised model, Baddeley (2000) suggested
that the episodic buffer integrates memory traces that may
originate from different senses into a coherent perceptual
scene.
On the basis of several studies, Postle (2006) has proposed
that the brain areas involved in sensory perception are also
responsible for the short-term storage of sensory information.
For instance, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies showed object-specific memorization effects for faces
in the posterior fusiform gyrus (e.g., Druzgal and D’Esposito,
2003; Ranganath et al., 2004), an area considered to be vital
for face recognition. Postle and D’Esposito (1999) found activity
related tomemorization of visual object location and depiction in
ventral temporal and occipital visual brain areas. Similarly, event-
related potential (ERP) modulations can be seen in posterior
and occipital recording sites during short-term memorization
of visual objects contralateral to the to-be-remembered objects
(e.g., Klaver et al., 1999; Vogel and Machizawa, 2004). Such
findings (for an overview see, Postle, 2006; D’Esposito and
Postle, 2015) indicate that memorizing modality-specific sensory
information involves the same brain areas as those involved
in the initial sensory processing of that information. This idea
is compatible with the classical view that integration of the
senses would take place at a later stage of processing, after
initial unisensory processing has taken place (see Talsma, 2015,
for a discussion). Indeed, using neurophysiological methods
with animals (e.g., Wallace et al., 1993; Fuster et al., 2000)
and fMRI with humans (e.g., Calvert et al., 2000; Wright
et al., 2003; Beauchamp et al., 2004) several higher-order
brain areas have been identified that seem to be dedicated
to integrating information from multiple unisensory sources.
Brain areas typically regarded as multisensory in the human
brain can for example be found in the lateral occipital-temporal
cortex, such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS; Beauchamp,
2005).
An increasing number of studies now suggest, however, that
multisensory processing can already take place in brain areas
that were considered to be strictly unisensory (see for a review,
Foxe and Schroeder, 2005; Macaluso and Driver, 2005). For
example, Giard and Peronnet (1999) found multisensory ERP
effects as early as 40 ms post-stimulus over occipital scalp areas,
suggesting that multisensory interactions take place much earlier
than previously assumed. Using fMRI, Foxe et al. (2002) showed
integration related effects of auditory and somatosensory stimuli
within a region of the auditory cortex previously thought to
be unisensory. This brain area was more strongly activated by
multisensory stimuli than what might be expected on the basis of
a mere summation of either auditory or tactile stimulation alone.
Likewise, Dionne et al. (2010) found increased BOLD signal
in the right primary somatosensory cortex during a delayed
sensory-to-motor task for cross-modal visual-somatosensory
stimuli compared to modality-specific stimuli.
These findings also have implications for the memorization
of multisensory information. If indeed, as Postle (2006) proposes,
the brain areas responsible for perceptual processing are the same
as those involved in memorization, and if multisensory effects
can already be observed in the primary sensory cortices, then we
would expect that cross-modal information is stored as a unified
representation in working memory. We specifically aim to focus
on the questions regarding how multisensory information is
encoded in working memory and whether we memorize the
individual unisensory representations separately and integrate
them at a later stage, or whether they are memorized as part of
an integrated, multimodal representation instead.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 197
Quak et al. Multisensory working memory
Feature Binding in Working Memory
To fully understand the importance of considering working
memory from a multisensory perspective, it is necessary to
discuss how information is organized within working memory.
An important question here is whether each feature of an
object is remembered separately or not (e.g., Luck and Vogel,
1997; Klaver et al., 1999; Vogel et al., 2001, 2005; Wheeler
and Treisman, 2002; Olsson and Poom, 2005; Luria et al.,
2010; Diamantopoulou et al., 2011; Luria and Vogel, 2011).
For example, Luck and Vogel (1997) used a change detection
task to examine the capacity of working memory for visual
objects. Participants were presented with an array of stimuli,
which they had to remember during an interval without the
stimuli being present. After this retention interval a second
array was presented and participants responded by indicating
whether any visual changes had occurred between the second
and the first array. Varying the number of visual objects that
need to be memorized allows estimating the capacity of visual
working memory. Luck and Vogel (1997) found that capacity
was limited to approximately four objects, regardless of the
number of feature dimensions, or individual features that needed
to be remembered per object. This led them to conclude
that visual working memory has an object-based and not a
feature-based organization. It is important to note that these
findings have not been replicated (Oberauer and Eichenberger,
2013; Hardman and Cowan, 2015). At the very least this
suggests that feature binding can, but does not always, occur
automatically.
Interestingly, research has shown that an asymmetry exists
in binding the visual and spatial features of an object. Multiple
studies have shown that processing the visual features of an object
automatically bind this object to its spatial location (e.g., Jiang
et al., 2000; Olson andMarshuetz, 2005). However, processing an
object’s spatial location does not result in the automatic binding
of that object’s visual features (Jiang et al., 2000). While these
findings show that binding of multiple features can occur within
the visuo-spatial domain, other studies have shown that binding
of features can even occur across domains.
Prabhakaran et al. (2000) showed that participants
memorized verbal and spatial information in an integrated
fashion. Participants in this study performed faster and more
accurate on a verbal-spatial delayed-match-to-sample task
when the probe was a letter-location combination that was
presented together in the sample array compared to a letter-
location combination that was presented separately. The
findings on binding of verbal and spatial information have
been replicated and extended in multiple studies (Bao et al.,
2007; Campo et al., 2008, 2010; Elsley and Parmentier, 2009;
Guérard et al., 2013; Meier et al., 2014). For example, Bao
et al. (2007) found that switching attention between verbal
and spatial features was faster when they were features from
one object than when they were features from separate objects.
Additionally, Guérard et al. (2013) showed that phonological
similarity of verbal material can carry over to the recall of
spatial locations in a combined verbal-spatial serial recall task.
Participants were sequentially presented with letters in specific
locations and were asked to either recall the order of spatial
locations shown or the order of letters shown. They found
that the harmful effect of phonological similarity on verbal
recall carried over to spatial recall, but that the harmful effect
of spatial complexity on spatial recall did not carry over to
verbal recall. While the question remains under which exact
circumstances automatic binding or integration of cross-domain
information occurs, the asymmetry found in visual feature and
location binding as well as verbal and spatial binding, suggest
that the automatic integration of information across domains
can occur.
Multisensory Working Memory
Representations
Despite the evidence for integration of information from
different domains, surprisingly little research has examined how
multisensory information is represented in working memory.
One of the first studies to use cross-modal stimuli was
done by Thompson and Paivio (1994). Participants memorized
three different types of items: visual, auditory, or audiovisual
for a later free-recall test. Thompson and Paivio found an
improvement of free recall of cross-modal audiovisual stimuli
compared to modality-specific, audio or visual stimuli. This
superior audiovisual performance was not simply due to the
double presentation of information in audiovisual conditions
(audio and visual dual presentation), because picture-picture
and sound-sound dual presentation conditions did not yield
a similar improvement. When pictures in the picture-picture
dual presentation condition were two different exemplars of
the same item a slight improvement in free recall was found
but audiovisual performance still resulted in higher recall
rates. Goolkasian and Foos (2005) also found that recall rates
were higher for picture/spoken word and written/spoken word
dual presentation conditions compared to the double visual
presentation of pictures and written words. These findings
suggest that the improved memory performance is due to the
combination of information from different modalities and not
because of the redundancy of the information itself.
In the multisensory literature, additive effects, such as for
example linear increases of brain activity for multisensory stimuli
(For an overview see; Calvert, 2001), are considered to be
exemplary of multisensory processing. By contrast, in working
memory research, similar additive effects, such as an increase in
capacity for audiovisual material compared to modality-specific
material, are considered evidence for the independence of the
twomodalities. For example, the advantage of cross-modal object
recall, in the study of Thompson and Paivio (1994) was explained
by Paivio (1971, 1986) ‘‘dual coding’’ theory. This theory states
that a memory trace for a cross-modal stimulus is a combination
of the independent sensory traces that were encoded, which
in turn can be recalled separately when the task so requires.
While information from different modalities can interact to
provide certain behavioral benefits, this information is in fact
independent.
Originally, the dual coding theory was developed to explain
the independent, simultaneous processing of verbal and
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non-verbal information, but has later also been used to
explain the independent, simultaneous processing of auditory
and visual information. It is important to note that these
forms of information can interact. Verbal information can
be both visual (e.g., written words) and/or auditory (e.g.,
spoken words), and nonverbal information can also be visual
(e.g., complex visual scenes) and/or auditory (e.g., white
noise). We can make a distinction between the format
of a working memory representation, i.e., the sensory
modality in which the information is perceived and/or
processed (e.g., auditory—visual), and the content of the
representation, i.e., the actual information that is transferred
(verbal–non-verbal). For example, when memorizing an array
of blue squares or a picture of a cat, it might be more efficient
to memorize this verbally as the verbal code ‘‘blue squares’’ or
‘‘red cat’’. However, when the task requires one to describe the
exact spatial location of each square, or point out a specific cat
in an array of red cat pictures, it would be more efficient to
use a visual code. We assume that information is processed in
the format code that is most optimal for the current task. This
implies that multiple format codes might be used for one and the
same object, if that is more effective for memorizing that object.
Delogu et al. (2009) investigated how verbal and non-verbal
auditory, visual, and audiovisual material is encoded in working
memory. Participants were tested on immediate serial recall for
sequentially presented visual, auditory, or audiovisual stimuli
in either a non-verbal or verbal condition. In the non-verbal
condition, stimuli were either pictures, environmental sounds, or
a combination of both, and in the verbal condition, stimuli were
either written words, spoken words, or a combination of both.
Results showed that in the non-verbal condition serial recall for
audiovisual stimuli was higher than recall for auditory or visual
stimuli. In the verbal condition, recall for audiovisual material
was still higher than recall for visual material, but auditory
and audiovisual recall did not differ. The authors also found
that preventing participants from articulating reduced memory
performance in both the verbal and non-verbal conditions.
This suggests that both in the verbal and in the non-verbal
presentation conditions, the actual content of the representation
was encoded in a verbal code. Furthermore, the verbal content
seemed to play a key part in memorizing the stimuli in all
conditions. This shows that the format in which information is
presented is not necessarily the format in which the information
is encoded. For example, when a participant is presented with
an auditory stimulus of a meowing cat, it is possible that this
sound calls forth a picture of a cat, or the word ‘‘cat’’, which is
then kept in working memory instead of the auditory features
of the original meowing sound that was presented. It is a
requirement that the participant recognizes the presented sound
as the meowing produced by a cat in order to ‘‘recode’’ the sound
into a visual or verbal representation. This requires semantic
information from long term memory to be integrated with the
working memory representation. Delogu et al. (2009) concluded
that their findings are compatible with Baddeley’s (2000) working
memory model where the existence of an episodic buffer
integrates information from different modalities and combines
this with semantic information from long term memory. Other
studies have also shown the influence of semantic information
from long term memory on visual working memory object
representations (e.g., Olsson and Poom, 2005; Diamantopoulou
et al., 2011) suggesting that information outside the pure visual
domain can affect early visual object working memory. Similarly,
Darling et al. (2012) found that accuracy on a digit serial recall
task improved when the locations of presented digits matched the
spatial configuration of a typical, numeral keypad (as found on a
telephone or television remote) in a process they call visuospatial
bootstrapping. They confirmed that this effect was due to the
integration of the typical keypad representation from long-term
memory with the working memory representation and not only
to the binding between verbal and spatial information.
Thus far, the main goal of the studies discussed above
was to provide insights into the dual code theory (Paivio,
1971, 1986) and/or the multiple component theory (Baddeley
and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000) mainly by looking at recall
performance for a wide variety of stimuli. To better understand
how multisensory information interacts in working memory we
can look at working memory capacity for cross-modal objects.
As mentioned before, estimates of working memory capacity
for features and objects have been used to infer that visual
working memory representations are object based (Luck and
Vogel, 1997). Likewise, by assuming that not only features within
a modality but also across modalities are integrated into object
representations, examining the number of cross-modal objects
one can hold in memory compared to modality-specific objects
could give insight into the organization of multisensory working
memory. For instance, Saults and Cowan (2007) found that
working-memory capacity for audiovisual material can exceed
working-memory capacity for modality-specific material under
certain conditions. In a series of five experiments, participants
were presented with visual arrays of four to eight colored squares
and auditory arrays of four spoken digits. They were instructed
to memorize the visual array, the auditory array, or both.
Interestingly, the performance advantage for audiovisual arrays
disappeared when masks were used to block access to previously
formed sensory memory traces. In this case, capacity for cross-
modal stimuli was as high as the capacity of the highest modality-
specific object, indicating that memory traces from an accessory
sensory memory (echoic and/or iconic memory) contributed
to the improvement of task performance. Since auditory and
visual information did not additively contribute to memory
performance when sensory memory traces were excluded,
Saults and Cowan (2007) concluded that auditory and visual
information share a common storage. Fougnie andMarois (2011)
contested this interpretation by arguing that the formula used by
Saults and Cowan (2007) to estimate the maximum number of
object representations one can hold in working memory, might
not adequately reflect the combined capacity of modality-specific
stores. Fougnie and Marois argued that one item of auditory
information generally places a larger load on memory than
one item of visual information, suggesting that these modality-
specific differences should be weighted accordingly in such a
capacity estimate. Using an adapted formula in a series of three
experiments, they found that even when using masks to exclude
contributions of sensory memory traces, capacity for cross-
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modal items was superior to the capacity for modality-specific
items. Contrary to Saults and Cowan (2007), they concluded that
auditory and visual objects were stored in their own respective
stores and contributed to performance without interfering.
Overall, there seems to be a performance benefit for
the memorization of audiovisual stimuli compared to the
memorization of modality-specific stimuli. It remains under
debate, however, whether this benefit exists because these stimuli
are integrated into a new amodal representation or because
the independent storage of auditory and visual information
contributes to performance in an additive fashion because they
do not interfere. At this time the same effect is used to argue
for both sides of the debate. Where some see the additive
performance of audiovisual objects as proof for an interaction or
even integration of information in workingmemory (e.g., Delogu
et al., 2009), others see it as proof that sensory information is
memorized in its own separate store (e.g., Fougnie and Marois,
2011).
In addition to examining performance benefits for the
combination of auditory and visual processing, we can also study
the disruption of processing for the combination of auditory
and visual information. In traditional working memory research,
interference paradigms have been used to show a double
dissociation between two separate processing mechanisms.
Meaning that when two processes use the same underlying
system, interference will occur which impairs performance
on both processes. The disruption of performance between
modalities is referred to as cross-modal interference and would
suggest that information from the different modalities interact
at a certain level. For multisensory working memory this
could mean that information from different modalities is
maintained in a single, multisensory store. Evidence for cross-
modal interference is still somewhat ambiguous, however. For
instance, using a visual-pattern-recall and auditory-digit-recall
dual task, Cocchini et al. (2002) did not find evidence for
cross-modal interference on performance accuracy in working
memory. The absence of such interference suggests that working
memory operates in a domain-specific manner and is in
accordance with the notion of parallel processing without
interaction of information from different modalities. In contrast,
Goolkasian and Foos (2005) showed that spoken words could
interfere with the recall of pictures and written words when
using long sequences of incongruent dually presented items.
Likewise, Morey and Cowan (2004, 2005), did find cross-modal
interference on performance accuracy when memory load was
sufficiently high. They examined digit span using a verbal-
visual dual task and found that participants showed interference
for visual memory recall but only when the verbal load was
sufficiently high (a load of 7 digits instead of 2). The interference
patterns observed in audio-visual dual tasks are as of yet
inconclusive on whether visual and auditory information share a
limited capacity storage. Although interference paradigms could
give us an answer on the question of whether information
from different modalities share a limited capacity storage or
not, they cannot answer whether the information from different
modalities is integrated in this single storage, or maintained as
independent modality-specific traces.
Thus far, research on multisensory working memory has
shown that recall is better for cross-modal objects compared
to modality-specific objects (Thompson and Paivio, 1994;
Goolkasian and Foos, 2005; Delogu et al., 2009), working
memory capacity is higher for cross-modal objects under certain
circumstances (Saults and Cowan, 2007; Fougnie and Marois,
2011), and visual and auditory information can interfere with
each other (Morey and Cowan, 2004, 2005; Goolkasian and
Foos, 2005) but not always (Cocchini et al., 2002). Although
a performance benefit for cross-modal objects is seen as
evidence for integration in multisensory research, in working
memory research it has traditionally been seen as evidence
that modality-specific information from cross-modal objects
is stored in separate stores. While we cannot definitively
conclude that cross-modal objects are stored as fully integrated
objects in working memory, it is apparent that cross-modal
information interacts in working memory beyond what would
be expected from modality-specific stores. The question is:
at what stage or stages in the processing stream do these
interactions occur?
Multisensory Processing, Selective
Attention, and Working Memory
To answer this question we turn to research on multisensory
processing and selective attention. The insights gained from this
research could also inform questions about working memory for
multisensory stimuli. In fact, more and more researchers have
challenged the idea that working memory and attention are two
separate systems (Cowan, 2001; Awh et al., 2006; Olivers, 2008;
Oberauer and Hein, 2012; Kiyonaga and Egner, 2013; Klaver
and Talsma, 2013). For example, Olivers (2008) reviews evidence
for the notion that working memory and attention share the
same capacity, content and control processes, suggesting they
might be two aspects of the same process. Likewise, Kiyonaga and
Egner (2013) discuss the literature that examined the effects of
external attention on working memory representations, as well
as, the effects of working memory representations on directing
selective attention. These studies indicate that a competitive
interaction between working memory and selective attention
exists, implying that they share a limited resource. Kiyonaga and
Egner (2013) state that attention and working memory should
no longer be regarded as two separate concepts, but instead as
one concept, where attention can be directed externally (selective
attention) and/or internally (working memory). The idea of
working memory as internal attention is in line with Cowan’s
(2001) original idea of working memory where a capacity limited
focus of attention can shift between different levels of processing.
Given the above mentioned observations that working
memory and attention are presumably two different aspects
of the same underlying process, and considering that several
studies have shown close ties between attention andmultisensory
processing, it is necessary to understand the implications of
these ties for working memory. Instances where multisensory
events guide and focus attention (also referred to as bottom-up
effects) suggest an early integration of multisensory information,
while instances where attention is needed for multisensory
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integration (also referred to as top-down effects) are indicative
of late integration processes. There is evidence for both types
of interaction between multisensory integration and attention.
Factors that determine the predominance of either early and/or
late interactions between information from different modalities
are for example, task-relevancy (e.g., Busse et al., 2005), learned
associations (e.g., Molholm et al., 2007), and saliency (e.g., Van
der Burg et al., 2008).
An example of top-down influence of attention on
multisensory integration was given by Talsma and colleagues
(e.g., Senkowski et al., 2005; Talsma and Woldorff, 2005; Talsma
et al., 2007). Using a rapid succession of task-relevant and
irrelevant stimuli, they found that attention could influence
the integration of cross-modal stimuli. Similarly, Alsius and
colleagues (Alsius et al., 2005, 2007) have shown that attending
elsewhere diminishes participants susceptibility to the McGurk
illusion (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). Based on these
findings it appears that attending to the relevant, to-be-
integrated stimuli is necessary to build a robust, integrated
representation (Talsma et al., 2010).
However, evidence for bottom-up modulation of attention
by multisensory integration has made it clear that multisensory
processing can already happen in very early stages of perception
(Giard and Peronnet, 1999; Molholm et al., 2002; Van der Burg
et al., 2011). For instance, Van der Burg et al. (2011) presented
dynamic displays consisting of line elements that randomly
changed orientation. When a target orientation change was
synchronized with a short, spatially uninformative tone, visual
search was strongly facilitated as compared to when the tone
was absent. The interpretation given to these results was that
the tone and the synchronized orientation change were bound
together into one coherent event, thereby forming a cross-modal
singleton that ‘‘popped out’’ between the non-synchronized
visual distractors. EEG data showed that thismultisensory benefit
was apparent as early as 50 ms post-stimulus onset and that the
strength of this effect predicted the magnitude of the behavioral
benefit during visual search, due to the auditory signal.
The findings above imply that both top-down (task-relevance
and learned associations) as well as bottom-up (salience)
processes are involved in multisensory integration. To resolve
this apparent contradiction between a bottom-up view of
multisensory processing, where early multisensory effects seem
to drive attention, and a top-down view of multi-sensory
processing, where attention seems to be required to integrate
cross-modal objects, Talsma et al. (2010) proposed a unified
framework of attention and multisensory processing. According
to this framework, early pre-attentive processes can bind
multisensory inputs together, but only when competition among
the individual inputs is low. Thus, the early latency processes
serve to cross-feed low-level information between the individual
sensory cortices involved in the integration processes. Early
interactions might serve to realign auditory and visual input
signals. Auditory information might give temporal information
to visual cortex whereas visual information might provide spatial
information to auditory processing.
This pre-attentive early integration would, according to
Talsma et al. (2010), only be possible, however, if the stimuli
presented in one modality do not need to compete for processing
capacity with other stimuli in that same modality. If there is
competition among multiple stimuli in one modality, top-down
attentional control may be required to filter out any stimulus
that is not task relevant, thereby prioritizing those stimuli that
are task relevant. Consistent with this view, Van der Burg et al.
(2012) found that the earlier mentioned automatic capture by
a synchronized cross-modal event can be modulated by the size
of the attentional window, meaning that when participants were
less focused the effect of the cross-modal pop out was stronger
than when participants were forced to focus on a small cue before
the synchronized cross-modal event. In conclusion, stimulus-
driven, bottom-up processes can automatically capture attention
towards multisensory events. Top-down attention can in turn
facilitate the integration of multisensory information which leads
to a spread of attention across sensory modalities.
Based on the previously mentioned idea that external
attention and internal attention (working memory) are two
aspects of the same process, findings in attentional research could
be applied to working memory. It has been shown that spatial
attention can actively influence workingmemory representations
by facilitating encoding (Uncapher et al., 2011) and improving
the recall of memorized representations (Murray et al., 2013).
These effects are found not only within a single modality, but
also across modalities. For instance, an auditory cue can draw
attention to a visual object and vice versa (Spence and Driver,
1997; Koelewijn et al., 2009). Similar effects for working memory
have been found by Botta et al. (2011). They examined the effect
of visual, auditory, and audiovisual cues on working memory for
arrays of colored squares in a change detection task. The cross-
modal and modality-specific cues could either capture attention
towards the hemifield which contained the to-be-remembered
objects, or towards the opposite hemifield which contained the
to-be-ignored objects. They found that audiovisual cues had a
larger influence on performance accuracy than modality-specific
visual or auditory cues. Memory accuracy was increased when an
audiovisual cue was presented on the same side as the target and
it was decreased when the audiovisual cue was presented on the
opposite side. Both the facilitation and impairment of memory
performance was larger for audiovisual cues compared to visual
cues. Although these data do not directly address the question of
how a cross-modal object is represented in working memory as
such, they do tell us that multisensory information has a bottom-
up effect on the subsequent memorization of a unisensory object.
Investigation of top-down effects of working memory on
attention has revealed that working memory content can affect
the allocation of visual selective attention (Olivers et al., 2006).
In a multisensory context, Murray et al. (2004) found that
discrimination accuracy of visual objects, presented 20 s after
initial presentation, improved when the initial presentation was
a picture-sound combination compared to a unisensory picture.
EEG data revealed that the neuronal response to a cross-modal
stimulus happened as fast as 60–136 ms and predominantly
influenced activation in the right lateral occipital complex.
Where a semantically congruent picture-sound combination
increased discrimination accuracy on a second presentation,
a pure tone decreased discrimination accuracy on a second
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presentation (Lehmann and Murray, 2005; Thelen et al., 2012).
Thelen et al. (2015) replicate these earlier findings, while also
showing the same effects in the auditory modality. Single-
trial multisensory memories affect later auditory recognition.
If cross-modal objects were congruent (visual and auditory
information match semantically) accuracy was higher compared
to unisensory stimuli but became worse if objects were
incongruent or meaningless. Unisensory percepts seem to
trigger the multisensory representations associated with them,
suggesting at least a partially integrated storage in memory.
Yet, it seems a multisensory representation stored in memory
is only beneficial for memory performance when sounds and
pictures are semantically congruent. These studies show that
an internal representation is formed in which both the visual
and auditory information is encoded. Moreover, they also
indicate that information presented in a task irrelevant modality
interferes with the task relevant representation. But although
this still does not address the question of whether unisensory
information is still accessible it does show that the original
unisensory representations are closely related. Similar to the
findings in research on attention and multisensory integration, it
seems that top-down and bottom-up processes play an important
part in the integration of cross-modal information in working
memory representations.
Predictive Coding and Multisensory
Working Memory
One influential framework that can explain the intricacies of top-
down and bottom-up interactions in multisensory memory is
that of predictive coding. The predictive coding framework states
that the brain produces a Bayesian estimate of the environment
(Friston, 2010). According to this view, stochastic models of
the environment exist in the brain, which are continuously
updated on the basis of processed sensory information. Higher-
order brain areas thus provide the lower areas with predictions
(or in Bayesian terms ‘‘priors’’) that influence the processing
of ongoing sensory input. A strong mismatch between the
prediction and the actual sensory input will then result in a major
update of the internal model. Thus when we are in a complex
environment with many stimuli competing for processing
capacity, incongruence between the top-down predictions of
the environment and the present incoming environmental
information can determine the priority with which incoming
stimuli need to be processed and integrated. The processed
information changes the predictions and vice versa. Bottom-up
sensory processing and top-down predictions mutually define
each other continuously. In this way, the predictive coding view
can explain how top-down and bottom-up processes interact in
multisensory integration.
Talsma (2015) recently argued that the dynamic model of
our environment provided by the aforementioned stochastic
representations is essential to understanding the interaction
between basic (multi)sensory processing on the one hand,
and memory and attention on the other. For instance, Vetter
et al. (2014) showed that actual auditory stimulation as well
as imagined sounds could activate the visual cortex. Based on
the predictive coding framework, these authors argued that
visual cortex activation came about because either direct sensory
information or a stored memory representation thereof could
update the internal representation of the sound and therefore
indirectly influence processing in visual cortex accordingly. This
suggests that attention, memory, andmultisensory processing are
intrinsically intertwined. Similarly, Berger and Ehrsson (2013,
2014) showed that imagined sounds can mimic the effects
of actual sounds in a number of well-known multisensory
illusions, such as the bounce-pass illusion (Sekuler et al., 1997),
the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976), or the
ventriloquist illusion (Howard and Templeton, 1966), and show
independent of each other that visual cortex can be activated
both bymultisensory stimulation and bymemory. Based on these
findings, Talsma (2015) argued that despite the fact that several
studies showed that auditory and visual inputs can interact at
very early processing stages, the actual integration of the sensory
inputs into a coherent mental representation occurs at later,
higher-order processing stages.
An important consequence of applying the predictive coding
framework is that our internal representation is assumed not
only to be built on the basis of direct sensory input, but that it
is also updated (and made consistent with) information stored
in memory. Thus, attention is assumed to play an essential role
in regulating how our sensory input is combined with these
pre-existing representations stored in long-term memory. This
is largely consistent with Cowan’s (2001) idea of the focus of
attention, which is a part of activated long-term memory, as well
as with Baddeley’s (2000) episodic buffer, although, Baddeley
recently argued that attention in the form of the central executive
was not necessary for the integration of multiple sources of
information in the episodic buffer (Baddeley et al., 2011).
A further consequence of applying the predictive coding
framework is that the internal representation is by definition
always multisensory. Moreover, the active representation
integrates all possible sources of information, including semantic
information from long-term memory. Thus, even when only
a unisensory stimulus is presented, associated representations
will be activated as well. These can include information from
other modalities, prior experience with the stimulus, or learned
associations. Because the formation of this internal mental
representation is an active process that influences ongoing
processes in the sensory cortices, this model can explain why
memory traces in one modality can be strengthened or corrupted
by traces in another one. Furthermore, because the active
representation sends feedback information to the low-level
processes in sensory cortices it can be assumed that the original
unisensory memory traces are still present albeit in a relatively
fragile state.
Multisensory Working Memory
Representations in Current Models
The active internal environmental model as proposed by the
predictive coding framework would be akin to what we would
describe as a multisensory working memory representation. This
memory representation does not only consist of information
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coming from different modalities but also includes information
from long-term memory such as semantic knowledge or
learned associations. Taking the previously mentioned example
of memorizing a cat picture the multisensory representation
includes not only the visual features of the cat, but also long-
term semantic knowledge of cats, autobiographical knowledge
(previous personal experience with cats), and information from
modalities not presented with the picture (the sound a cat makes
or the knowledge that its fur is soft to the touch). We assume
that working memory has an amodal central storage component.
Whether this is the main component of working memory as
suggested by Cowan (2001) or a part of a bigger system like
the episodic buffer in (Baddeley’s, 2000; Baddeley et al., 2011)
remains a point for further investigation.
The predictive coding framework would suggest that
incoming sensory information is constantly used to update the
internal environmental model, implying that incoming stimuli
tend to integrate into a coherent multisensory representation.
This framework can also explain why workingmemory is amodal
in some cases and modality specific in others. For instance,
Postle (2006) argued that working memory for modality-specific
stimuli occurs in the sensory cortices. Recently, Yonelinas
(2013) suggested that high-resolution bindings are stored in
the hippocampus that can be used to support perception and
working memory, specifically in memorizing (combinations of)
complex features. In the latter case it is plausible that the
multisensory representation will be activated, whereas in the
former case it is not. Based on this, one important implication
of the predictive coding approach is that differences in task
and stimulus complexity can yield rather drastically different
outcomes. With this in mind a recommendation for future
research would be to consider effects of task and stimulus
complexity on working memory activation.
Based on the above mentioned framework, we assume
that sensory cortices can retain small amounts of modality-
specific information (as suggested by Postle, 2006) and that this
information supports a multisensory memory representation in
higher order areas (e.g., the hippocampus; Yonelinas, 2013).
Whether working memory for a specific task involves the higher-
order areas or the sensory areas to retain information for limited
time depends on the task and the information that needs to
be memorized. For example, simple flashes and beeps could be
retained in the sensory areas, whereas more complex information
would also require the higher-order areas. In that sense the
sensory cortices would retain information in a manner similar to
separate slave systems (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) or the recently
suggested peripheral storage (Cowan et al., 2014).
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed recent developments in
multisensory working memory research. Research has shown
that cross-modal information interacts in working memory
beyond what would be expected from the traditional modality-
specific stores. Recall is better for cross-modal objects compared
to modality-specific objects (Thompson and Paivio, 1994;
Goolkasian and Foos, 2005; Delogu et al., 2009), working
memory capacity can be higher for cross-modal objects than
for unimodal objects (Saults and Cowan, 2007; Fougnie and
Marois, 2011), and visual and auditory memory can interfere
with each other (Morey and Cowan, 2004, 2005; Goolkasian
and Foos, 2005). Furthermore, multisensory information has an
effect on the subsequent memorization of a unisensory object
(Botta et al., 2011) and multisensory memory representations
can influence subsequent unisensory stimulus discrimination
(Murray et al., 2004; Lehmann and Murray, 2005; Thelen
et al., 2012, 2015). Taken together, these studies show that
sensory representations in multiple modalities interact more
with each other than can be explained by classical modal
models.
Paivio’s (1971, 1986) dual coding theory states that although
cross-modal information can interact it is in fact independent,
because modality-specific information can still be retrieved in
isolation. However, studies done by Thelen and colleagues
(Thelen et al., 2012, 2015) show that this retrieval of modality-
specific information from a cross-modal representation is more
difficult than assumed, because a task irrelevant modality
interferes with the task relevant representation. Moreover,
higher-order representations of the external world built from
memorized information have been shown to influence visual
processing. Complex representations seem to be formed in
working memory, consisting of the integration of several
independent representations that can be sensory, and short- or
long-term memory activations. Depending on task requirements
either just the simple modal representation or the complex high-
resolution binding of several features at once will become active.
Therefore, we conclude that working memory is in essence
multisensory, and that this must be taken into account to achieve
a realistic understanding of how working memory processes
maintain and manipulate information.
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